On this date in 1863 ...

Union generals John Buford, John Reynolds, Abner Doubleday and OO Howard might have saved the Union by their actions at Gettysburg.

Buford and Reynolds by initially delaying the Confederate attack, and then when all four commanders withdrew to the high ground at Cemetary Hill, and subsequently to Cemetary Ridge, Culp's Hill and Litttle Round Top.

Reynolds, of course, was killed at 10 a.m. and wasn't around to see it.

Coupled with the fall of Vicksburg on July 4, perhaps the four most important days in US history, until the mail-in ballot counting on the four days after the 2020 election enabled Biden to win and save the country.

 

There was so much that went right for the Union that day. Even when it looked like the South was going to bust the lines, reinforcements got there just in time to save the day.

It’s honestly incredible on the celebrated anniversary of the country, we fight two decisive battles to save it.

 

You also have to throw in Lee's vague order to Ewell to "take that hill if practicable" and Ewell deciding not to, allowing the Union to to reinforce and dig in.
Then on Day 2, Lee ignored Longstreet's idea to pull the Confederate army south toward DC, forcing the Union to follow them or giving it a direct march to Washington.

 

This brigade played a major role on Day 1 of the battle. https://www.thisiswhywestand.net/single-post/2018/07/01/the-iron-brigade-at-the-battle-of-gettysburg

 

“The enemy attacked me about 4 p.m. this day and, after one of the severest contests of the war, was repulsed at all points. ... I shall remain in my present position to-morrow, but am not prepared to say, until better advised of the condition of the army, whether my operations will be of an offensive or defensive character.”

— Gen. George Meade, telegraph to Halleck in Washington D.C., July 2, 1863​

 

My third great grandfather was captured and paroled at Vicksburg on July 3.

 

But taking the hill wasn’t practicable, especially while avoiding a general engagement without more of the army at hand, which Lee also ordered Ewell to consider in the same “if practicable” order.

The Union already had fresh troops there. Hancock was on top by 5 pm and was confident in the position, and growing more confident in the flanks as more troops arrived. Ewell didn’t have artillery in position and the Union did. He couldn’t deploy his troops properly because the town was in the way. He didn’t have a lot of fresh troops until too late in the day. And even if Ewell had managed to gain a foothold, he didn’t have the strength, or support from Hill, to hold it.

With the position that corps was in, with the troops at hand, Ewell was a lot more likely to absolutely wreck his divisions on Cemetery Hill than he was to carry and hold it. Jackson would have had no better opportunity had he been there.

Lee was caught too strung out and couldn’t consolidate fast enough to take advantage of his dream scenario of crushing the Union corps one by one.

Meade had good commanders and good troops fighting on Northern soil in the right places at the right times. It wasn’t luck (any more so than any other ACW battle). Sickles wandering away with his corps was the kind of bad luck/poor decision making thing that broke the Union’s back in other battles.

It also wasn’t bad orders or JEB Stuart or Jackson’s death or Lee’s command style. It was stout, steady commanders in Meade and his subordinates trading blows with Lee when to few Union generals to that point had dared.

“Well if Ewell had…” says the Lost Cause. It’s a shame he didn’t. The Confederacy would have been crushed that much sooner.

 

Meade didn’t really trade blows with Lee. He took advantage of superior position and fantastic generals under him. He was dismissed by Lincoln shortly after Gettysburg because he didn’t press the advantage when Lee was fleeing to the Potomac. Meade got lucky in many ways but there’s a reason Grant finished off in charge of the AoP.

The loss of Jackson was objectively a major blow to the South. It’s impossible to say what he would have achieved if he’d been alive for the battle, but he was a key general and that loss was costly.

Yes the high ground made Lee’s defeat highly likely and yes Ewell knew he couldn’t press an attack like Lee wanted. But also had some things go wrong and some bad decisions. For example, the Union could have been pushed out if the South chose a spot and stuck with it. They tried here and there and over there.

 

We’ll discuss that in more detail on Tuesday.

 

Meade wasn’t dismissed by Lincoln, wasn’t replaced by Grant and did command the AoP to Appomattox, so…

Meade didn’t deserve the scorn he got from Lincoln after Gettysburg. He had an exhausted army and while defeated, Lee was still extremely dangerous. When Meade did finally have an opportunity chance to attack, Lee was waiting, dug in and appropriately supplied. Meade wisely didn’t press, even if a victory could have won the war.

As for Jackson, the best thing that ever happened to his reputation was dying after his finest moment. He may have been brilliant (against subpar Union generals) in the Valley, and at Chancellorsville, but there were plenty of campaigns where his performance was extremely average. In any case, his death changed everything about the ANV and it’s unlikely he’d have been facing Ewell’s dilemma. Butterfly flaps its wings and all… but if he had, he’d likely have found himself with a wrecked command if he’d assaulted Cemetery Hill that evening. Now if he’d swung around to the very lightly defended Culp’s Hill… but no Confederate general standing there had any real way of knowing that.

 

Oops, forgot to say, fair enough? Meade effectively parried Lee’s punches. Maybe that’s more fair than “traded blows.” My main point is he stood and fought, which is a lot more than, say, Hooker or McClellan could say.

 

He led the AOP, my mistake, but he was put into a lesser command role and it was Grant who was promoted over him.