2013 MLB Hall of Fame Screechfest

I'm talking about the orders he gave, not the orders he carried out.

 

Dick. Let go. Your analogy doesn't work.

 

It works perfectly: It illustrates that there are limits to the degree of bad behavior that we're willing to excuse due to the stamp of approval of authority.

I wanted to establish that.

We established it.

 

What?

 

But the specific behavior always matters when making this type of judgment, does it not?

I would argue that no one — at least no one rational — has a cut-and-dried opinion about the justification of "approval of authority" as a philosophical matter. The actions involved are what give the approval any meaning.

So the real question here is: Just because something is against the law, does that make the action objectively "wrong"? Prohibition is another good test case here. Was the act of buying/selling/consuming alcohol any more "right" or "wrong" in 1932 than it was in 1933? Most people would argue it was never "wrong". But the law changed because the culture changed.

That could well be the case with PEDs one day — and I, for one, would argue that our culture already widely condones "performance-enhancing" substances and procedures of all kinds (re: the widespread popularity and availability of LASIK, Viagra, etc., etc.)

 

Agree with every word.

And it's interesting to me to see where different people's lines are.

 

But that doesn't mean that "approval of authority" is NEVER a valid justification, depending on the behavior.

 

Not at all. Indeed, perhaps it is a justification here. Like I said in the original, pre-atrocities post, I think that the players' culpability gets dispensed with by a lot of people a little too easily under that guise. But certainly approval of authority can be a valid justification for bad behavior. Like driving 60 in a 55, right?

 

Dick this is idiotic.

- You're citing Calley as "authority?" Hardly. The institution of the the army is the authority in your example. Just as "baseball" is in mine.

- You don't think following a direct order from a superior in a combat zone deforms your example as regards ethics?

- Your Calley analogy would work if we were arguing about one rogue baseball manager who insisted all his players juice, despite a clear and detailed policy against doing so by the league.

- Are some violations of some codes excusable and others not? Of course, but you don't need to build a tortured parallel between the conduct of a game and a war crime to get there.

 

I agree.

 

Bingo. And to get back to the other major flaw in this whole line of discussion:

There were clear, direct incentives — major, tangible incentives — for players who took PEDs (not to mention the fact that there was no testing and/or punishment for players who did take PEDs.) Baseball officials actively helped promote, celebrate and reward those players; if they did think PEDs were wrong, then they turned a blind eye to it.

None of that applies to following orders in the Army, which does not (ideally) turn a blind eye when you follow an unethical order and has a long history of punishing those who do.

 

It is noted that not all leader-subject relationships are created equally. And these subsequent posts - drawing them out - was my intent. People too easily dismiss the players' culpability because baseball condoned it. But those relationship dynamics are not determinative, to me. To understand why players are not culpable, we have to examine why other subjects in leader-subject situations are.