Bubbler
Well-Known Member
- Joined
- Aug 3, 2004
- Messages
- 25,666
Did you know that on Sept. 26, 1983 and Nov. 8, 1983, you almost died?
You. Me. Damn near everyone on the planet. Those of you not born yet. Everyone.
On those two days -- for different, but related reasons -- the Soviet Union was one button-push away from launching an all-out nuclear attack on the United States. Especially in the case of Nov. 8, the missiles were in their bunkers, submarines were off our coasts and under the polar ice, mobile SAM's were in position to strike western Europe from the Warsaw Pact nations. The most minor provocation was going to set off WWIII.
It's a long story laid out in a two-hour documentary I DVR'd from the Discovery Channel last night called Soviet War Scare 1983. It was a uniformly excellent documentary, with most of the principles still alive involved wittingly or unwittingly involved in what was damn near nuclear armageddon.
Long story short is that Soviet mistrust of the U.S. -- helped in a massively large part by Ronald Reagan's warmongering of his first term -- combined with a deeply flawed Soviet intelligence system, combined with the Soviets' then-octogenarian and paranoid Politburo, combined with the culture of the Russians themselves, who didn't want to be blindsided as they were in WWII, made the Soviets believe that NATO and the U.S. was going to launch a nuclear first strike against them in short order.
The lack of communication between the nations at the time made the feeling unnecessarily deep-seeded. Ominously, the Soviet head of the KGB at the time would not accept any intelligence that suggested otherwise and the Soviets had no analytical apparatus within its intelligence culture.
With tensions in late '83 very high because of American missile deployment in Europe, the Korean airline disaster in August (for those of you too young to remember, the Soviets accidentally shot down a Korean Airlines jet that strayed over Russia, believing it to be a spy plane), the American invasion of Grenada, the heightened alert of the American military after the Beirut bombing, among many other things, the Soviets talked themselves into the belief that invasion was imminent.
When NATO announced war games for early Nov., called Able Archer, the Soviets believed it was cover for a real nuclear attack, despite the fact the Soviets knew Able Archer was a yearly exercise carried out by NATO that always ended with a fake massive nuclear strike. Such was the paranoia and the belief that Reagan was serious about launching a first-strike nuclear attack.
Before that, however, the real thing nearly occurred by accident on Sept. 26. In an incident straight out of the movie WarGames, the Soviet early warning system detected what it believed was a missile launch from one of the U.S. midwestern silos. The Soviet Colonel in charge of that post, Stanislav Petrov, would not launch missiles without visual confirmation from the Soviet spy satellite, which didn't indicate any launch, despite pressure from the paranoid leadership above him.
Petrov disabled the early warning system, only to have it go off twice more. The Soviets were on highest alert, ready to launch, but an ailing Yuri Andropov elected to trust Col. Petrov's judgement, and the system was disabled twice more. It turned out that the early warning system was picking up deflections from the sun off high-altitude clouds.
Petrov probably saved us all (apparently, Petrov is the topic of a Cronkite documentary next year) from annihilation, but was later cashiered out of the Soviet military for exposing such a fundamental flaw.
(continued ...)
You. Me. Damn near everyone on the planet. Those of you not born yet. Everyone.
On those two days -- for different, but related reasons -- the Soviet Union was one button-push away from launching an all-out nuclear attack on the United States. Especially in the case of Nov. 8, the missiles were in their bunkers, submarines were off our coasts and under the polar ice, mobile SAM's were in position to strike western Europe from the Warsaw Pact nations. The most minor provocation was going to set off WWIII.
It's a long story laid out in a two-hour documentary I DVR'd from the Discovery Channel last night called Soviet War Scare 1983. It was a uniformly excellent documentary, with most of the principles still alive involved wittingly or unwittingly involved in what was damn near nuclear armageddon.
Long story short is that Soviet mistrust of the U.S. -- helped in a massively large part by Ronald Reagan's warmongering of his first term -- combined with a deeply flawed Soviet intelligence system, combined with the Soviets' then-octogenarian and paranoid Politburo, combined with the culture of the Russians themselves, who didn't want to be blindsided as they were in WWII, made the Soviets believe that NATO and the U.S. was going to launch a nuclear first strike against them in short order.
The lack of communication between the nations at the time made the feeling unnecessarily deep-seeded. Ominously, the Soviet head of the KGB at the time would not accept any intelligence that suggested otherwise and the Soviets had no analytical apparatus within its intelligence culture.
With tensions in late '83 very high because of American missile deployment in Europe, the Korean airline disaster in August (for those of you too young to remember, the Soviets accidentally shot down a Korean Airlines jet that strayed over Russia, believing it to be a spy plane), the American invasion of Grenada, the heightened alert of the American military after the Beirut bombing, among many other things, the Soviets talked themselves into the belief that invasion was imminent.
When NATO announced war games for early Nov., called Able Archer, the Soviets believed it was cover for a real nuclear attack, despite the fact the Soviets knew Able Archer was a yearly exercise carried out by NATO that always ended with a fake massive nuclear strike. Such was the paranoia and the belief that Reagan was serious about launching a first-strike nuclear attack.
Before that, however, the real thing nearly occurred by accident on Sept. 26. In an incident straight out of the movie WarGames, the Soviet early warning system detected what it believed was a missile launch from one of the U.S. midwestern silos. The Soviet Colonel in charge of that post, Stanislav Petrov, would not launch missiles without visual confirmation from the Soviet spy satellite, which didn't indicate any launch, despite pressure from the paranoid leadership above him.
Petrov disabled the early warning system, only to have it go off twice more. The Soviets were on highest alert, ready to launch, but an ailing Yuri Andropov elected to trust Col. Petrov's judgement, and the system was disabled twice more. It turned out that the early warning system was picking up deflections from the sun off high-altitude clouds.
Petrov probably saved us all (apparently, Petrov is the topic of a Cronkite documentary next year) from annihilation, but was later cashiered out of the Soviet military for exposing such a fundamental flaw.
(continued ...)